Why Hasn’t Terrorism Been Eliminated?
By Asif Haroon Raja
Pakistan’s security forces have been fighting foreign-aided terrorism since 2001, almost continuously, in their effort to eliminate a menace that has evolved into an existential threat to the country’s sovereignty, security and territorial integrity.
Owing to their herculean efforts and enormous sacrifices, the enemies of Pakistan have failed to accomplish their sinister objectives.
However, this prolonged struggle has cost Pakistan around 100,000 lives and an estimated financial loss of $150 billion, besides inflicting immense social and psychological trauma on the nation.
Despite these sacrifices and sustained counterterrorism operations, the fires of terrorism in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan have yet to be completely extinguished.
The years 2025 and 2026 have proved particularly deadly, with terrorist attacks and casualties occurring almost daily.
Instead of acknowledging the gallantry and sacrifices of the security forces, some critics in Pakistan ask a seemingly straightforward question: Why has terrorism not been eliminated despite so many years of counterterrorism operations?
They blame the military leadership for joining the War on Terror, which they argue was not Pakistan’s war; for allegedly following Washington’s dictates; and for failing to formulate a viable exit strategy.
They also blame successive governments for mishandling relations with Afghanistan.
There is, however, an apparent contradiction in some of this criticism. On the one hand, critics complain that Pakistan has not done enough to befriend the Taliban regime in Kabul.
On the other hand, they argue that Pakistan’s occasional surgical air strikes against terrorist sanctuaries in Afghanistan are insufficient because air power alone cannot eliminate terrorism.
They consequently advocate sustained strikes accompanied by ground operations to achieve decisive results.
Pakistan has suffered from instability in Afghanistan for nearly four decades.
Between 2021 and 2025, it largely pursued a policy of engagement, restraint and appeasement despite a steady increase in terrorism emanating from Afghan territory.
During that period, many critics themselves argued that one-sided appeasement was counterproductive and that Pakistan needed to adopt a firmer posture.
At the same time, Pakistan faced the strategic dilemma of a potential two-front challenge from the East and West.
This compelled it to remain defensive, exercise strategic restraint and continue diplomatic engagement with Kabul, despite what it perceived as ingratitude, cross-border terrorism and Afghanistan’s growing strategic relationship with India.
When Pakistan subsequently shifted from a predominantly defensive posture towards a more proactive one from October 2025 onwards, some of the same critics changed their position.
They began objecting to Pakistan’s proactive policy, including Operation Ghazab Lil-Haq, and repeatedly called for restraint and negotiations with the Afghan Taliban and, in some cases, even with the TTP.
Criticism of the government, military leadership and security forces is legitimate in a democracy when it is constructive, evidence-based and intended to improve policy.
However, criticism that selectively ignores the sacrifices of the security forces, overlooks the activities of terrorist organisations and their alleged external linkages, or seeks to demoralise the institutions fighting terrorism serves little constructive purpose.
Greater attention should also be devoted to those who maintain clandestine links with proscribed organisations and to the external networks allegedly supporting them.
It was partly owing to calls for restraint and diplomacy that Pakistan agreed to put the brakes on its cross-border offensive posture and participate in talks at Doha and Istanbul earlier this year.
The Afghan Taliban, however, appeared to use the diplomatic process to buy time.
Pakistan’s assessment was that the pause enabled the Taliban to regroup, reposition strategic assets from exposed forward areas to densely populated urban centres and prepare for renewed cross-border activity after the winter snows receded.
When Pakistan once again intensified its response to a fresh wave of terrorist attacks, and Afghanistan’s own internal security situation became increasingly volatile, the Taliban regime again appealed for restraint and offered assurances of good behaviour.
Yet significant terrorist attacks have continued in both major theatres of conflict.
Why Has Terrorism Persisted?
Several factors have contributed to Pakistan’s inability to completely eliminate the scourge of terrorism:
- A Deliberate Destabilisation Strategy:
Following 9/11, Pakistan became a major theatre of terrorism and proxy warfare.
According to Pakistan’s security assessment, the objective of its adversaries was not merely to create insecurity but to destabilise, weaken and ultimately compromise the country’s sovereignty, strategic autonomy and nuclear capability.
- The Threat of Fragmentation:
A particularly dangerous dimension of the hostile strategy, according to Pakistani authorities, is the attempt to fragment the country into smaller entities.
Balochistan, because of its geography, natural resources and geostrategic location, has consequently remained a major arena of proxy warfare and foreign intelligence activity.
- Strategic Encirclement and Internal Destabilisation:
The broader strategy has been described as an attempt to strategically encircle and isolate Pakistan, create social divisions, destabilise it politically, weaken it economically, bleed it militarily and ultimately undermine its strategic capabilities.
- A Prolonged Proxy War:
For more than two decades, Pakistan has confronted a complex proxy conflict involving terrorist organisations operating from sanctuaries outside its borders, particularly from Afghanistan, while facing allegations of external support and financing.
- International Military Presence:
During the US-led intervention in Afghanistan, a large multinational military presence, together with Afghan security forces and intelligence networks, operated in the region. Pakistan simultaneously confronted an expanding terrorist threat on its western frontier.
- The Burden Borne by Pakistan’s Security Institutions:
The Pakistan Army, intelligence agencies and other security forces have carried the principal burden of combating foreign-aided and domestically facilitated terrorism through countless intelligence-based operations, military campaigns and counterterrorism measures.
- Resurgence after 2021:
Following the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021, Pakistan witnessed a resurgence of terrorism.
The TTP, BLA and other militant organisations have exploited the security vacuum, porous borders and alleged sanctuaries across the frontier.
- External Financing and Support:
Pakistan maintains that terrorist organisations, particularly the TTP and BLA, receive external financial, logistical and intelligence support. Concrete proofs have been provided to all concerned.
India has repeatedly been accused by Pakistan of supporting anti-Pakistan militant groups, while other external actors have also been alleged to have contributed to the destabilisation campaign.
Till the four-day war with India, Pakistan was berated and viewed as a terror abetting state and a failing state. This impression was built by the Indian media through fabricated narratives and presenting India as a victim of terrorism.
Pakistan’s story was never heard because of India’s diplomatic influence and the Indo-US-Israel- Afghanistan-West nexus.
- Weak Governance in KP and Balochistan:
Weak governance, inadequate administrative capacity, poor law enforcement and the failure to fully implement counterterrorism measures have impeded the fight against militancy in the two most affected provinces.
- Failure to Fully Implement the National Action Plan:
The National Action Plan, formulated in January 2015, provided a comprehensive framework for combating terrorism, extremism, hate speech, terrorist financing and militant networks.
Its incomplete implementation over the years reflects weaknesses in governance, accountability and political will.
- Political and Administrative Vulnerabilities:
Where political, tribal, bureaucratic or commercial interests overlap with militant networks, the state finds it difficult to establish effective writ.
Such linkages, wherever they exist, must be exposed and dealt with strictly according to law rather than being allowed to become instruments of political manipulation.
- Tribal and Feudal Interests:
In parts of Balochistan, powerful tribal and political interests have considerable influence.
Allegations of collaboration or accommodation with militant groups must be investigated objectively, and those found facilitating terrorism should face the law irrespective of their status.
- An Inconsistent Afghan Policy:
Pakistan’s policy towards Kabul has at times been inconsistent—alternating between engagement, accommodation, diplomatic pressure and military action.
One reason was the hope that the Taliban could be persuaded to prevent their territory from being used against Pakistan. That expectation has, so far, not produced the desired results.
- Political Cover for Militancy:
The role of political actors who, deliberately or otherwise, provide political space, justification or cover to extremist and militant elements deserves serious scrutiny.
Political differences must never be allowed to compromise the national fight against terrorism.
- Contradictory Policies of Major Powers:
Pakistan also faces what it perceives as contradictory policies by major powers. While some countries formally designate militant organisations as terrorist entities, their broader strategic policies in the region do not always appear consistent with Pakistan’s security interests.
One glaring example is the dualty of the USA in its dealings with India and Pakistan. Since 1993, the former has been granted all the material benefits; its crimes against humanity are overlooked. Pakistan on the other hand, despite being an ally, was made into a convenient scapegoat and constantly blamed and punished for its uncommitted sins .
This tendency is still in practice even after the changed geopolitical landscape. The US signed a ten-year defence pact with india last year, and is facilitating induction of sophisticated weapons systems into the Indian arsenal.
The US overruled Pakistan’s resolution in the UN seeking travel ban and closure of bank accounts and financial deposits/ transfers of the banned BLA and Majeed Brigade on the plea of additional proofs.
- The International Response to Terrorist financing:
Pakistan has repeatedly sought stronger international action against organisations it identifies as responsible for terrorism.
Greater international cooperation is required to restrict their financing, movement, recruitment, communications and access to weapons.
- Technology and Intelligence Warfare:
The increasing availability of drones, satellite imagery, secure communications and other technologies has transformed terrorism. These facilities and the American weapons left behind in Afghanistan are available to TTP, BLA, IS-KP and Al-Qaeda.
Militant organisations can exploit these capabilities to improve surveillance, identify targets and conduct attacks with greater precision.
Counterterrorism strategies must therefore keep pace with rapidly evolving technology.
- Continued External Support:
Pakistan maintains that substantial resources continue to be devoted by hostile external actors to supporting cross-border terrorism.
Islamabad must continue to document such evidence, expose it internationally and build a stronger diplomatic and legal case against those facilitating terrorism.
All these factors have complicated Pakistan’s efforts to eradicate terrorism despite thousands of intelligence-based operations inside the country and repeated military operations against terrorist networks.
The security forces continue to suffer casualties while confronting an enemy that is dispersed, clandestine, technologically adaptive and capable of exploiting difficult terrain and porous borders.
Afghanistan: The Central Security Challenge
The Taliban regime’s failure to prevent terrorist organisations from operating from Afghan territory has become one of the most serious sources of tension between Islamabad and Kabul.
Pakistan believes that the Afghan Taliban have either been unwilling or unable to dismantle the TTP infrastructure operating from Afghan soil.
The danger is compounded by the alleged convergence of interests between the TTP, BLA and external actors seeking to destabilise Pakistan. Afghanistan’s territory must not be allowed to become a launching pad for attacks against its neighbours.
The Taliban regime is now confronting serious internal, economic and security challenges. Its appeals to Pakistan for accommodation should therefore be judged not merely by words but by verifiable actions. Peace requires reciprocal commitments, not unilateral concessions.
The Political Dimension
Pakistan’s counterterrorism campaign cannot succeed through military operations alone. Political stability, effective governance, economic development, judicial reform, intelligence coordination, border management and the elimination of terrorist financing are equally essential.
The opposition’s principal political concerns, however, often revolve around the release of political leaders and prisoners rather than the wider national security challenge.
Political differences are a legitimate feature of democracy, but terrorism should never become a partisan issue.
KP, being the province most severely affected by terrorism, requires particularly close coordination between the federal and provincial governments.
The provincial government must cooperate fully with the security forces in intelligence-based operations, border management, action against illegal trafficking and the implementation of the National Action Plan.
Afghan Refugees
The issue of Afghan refugees also requires a balanced policy. Pakistan has hosted millions of Afghans for more than four decades, bearing a considerable economic and social burden.
If not all, a large majority has become a big security hazard because of their secret linkages with foreign intelligence agencies, TTP, BLA and the Afghan militants.
The refugee camps in KP and Baluchistan have become spy dens because of reported patronage of some MPAs and officials of the two provincial governments.
Any infiltration of militant networks into refugee communities or exploitation of refugee populations for terrorist purposes must be dealt with firmly.
Refugees should not collectively be treated as terrorists, but neither should security concerns be ignored. The illegal refugees must be deported forthwith.
Governance and Constitutional Reform
The continuing security crisis is also a reminder that Pakistan’s political and administrative structure requires reform.
The creation of additional provinces or smaller administrative units could be considered as one possible remedy for some of the country’s chronic governance problems.
Smaller and more manageable units could bring the government closer to the people, improve service delivery, promote balanced development and strengthen political representation.
However, such restructuring must be undertaken through constitutional consensus and without an ethnic or parochial agenda. It should be accompanied by genuine fiscal, political and administrative empowerment of local governments.
The objective should not be the division of Pakistan but the decentralisation of power, equitable distribution of resources and bringing the state closer to its citizens.
Similarly, any proposed constitutional amendments, revisions to the 18th Amendment or changes in the NFC Award should be debated openly and settled through constitutional mechanisms and inter-provincial consensus.
The Way Forward
Pakistan cannot afford either complacency or endless war. The objective must be the complete elimination of terrorism through a comprehensive national strategy combining intelligence, policing, military operations, border management, economic development, political stability and diplomatic pressure.
The government and military leadership need to remain on the same page on the fundamental issue of national security.
The security forces, for their part, must continue to operate with exemplary professionalism, intelligence-led precision and strict adherence to law.
The National Action Plan should finally be implemented in letter and spirit. NACTA and other counterterrorism institutions should be strengthened and empowered to coordinate federal and provincial efforts.
Terrorist financing, recruitment, propaganda, facilitators and sleeper networks must be pursued with the same determination as armed militants.
Pakistan should simultaneously exploit the favourable geopolitical environment to attract foreign direct investment, expand joint ventures and defence-industrial cooperation with friendly countries, and strengthen its diplomatic position.
A stronger economy will provide greater resources for national security, while political stability will reduce the space available to those seeking to exploit internal divisions.
The war against terrorism is therefore not merely a military contest. It is a battle for Pakistan’s political stability, economic resilience, social cohesion and national sovereignty.
The ultimate question is not simply why terrorism has survived for so long. The more important question is whether Pakistan can now eliminate the conditions—internal and external—that enable terrorism to survive.
Pakistan’s security forces have demonstrated repeatedly that they possess the courage and capability to defeat terrorists.
What is required now is a whole-of-state and whole-of-nation approach, sustained political will, uncompromising action against facilitators and financiers, effective governance and a coherent long-term strategy.
The fight may be long, but it is not unwinnable. Terrorism can be defeated when the state speaks with one voice, institutions perform their constitutional responsibilities, political differences remain within democratic limits, and the nation refuses to provide terrorists with either sanctuary or political space.
About the Author
Brigadier (Retd) Asif Haroon Raja, SI (M) is a war veteran. He is Command and Staff Course and War Course qualified, holds an MSc in War Studies, and served as Defence Attaché in Egypt and Sudan, as well as Dean of the Corps of Military Attachés in Cairo. He commanded the largest brigade in Kashmir.
He is a defence, security, and geopolitical analyst, columnist, featured columnist of IntelDrop magazine Washington, author of five books, former Chairman of Thinkers Forum Pakistan, Patron-in-Chief of Centre for Development Studies Think Tank, Director of Meesakh Research Centre; he regularly appears on media platforms.
