LETTERS ON KARGIL EPISODE
First letter on the above issue was sent by me to a news paper in October 2003. It was sent to one Mr Aslam Minhas who did not see eye to eye with the then DGMO, Maj Gen Pervez Musharraf when he presented his “plan” on Kargil much earlier. Mr Aslam’s comments were that the action done by Gen Musharraf had set back the Indo-Pak peace process by 20 years. My reply to Mr Aslam was that Pakistan had to act to make the issue become the flash-point. This was just a routine letter to a newspaper by me as a reader. In return, the newspaper received a reply from a Hindu, Mr Rangudu R. Atlanta, USA via mail on 8 October 2003, saying “Brig AQ Anjum displays legendary skill when he claims Kargil was a great gamble”
Later, I have had another message, “Our Kargil Victory” wherein Mr Khurshid Anwar blamed Musharraf to ask the PM to seek an American Intervention” to stop the Indian troops from attacking Pakistan (refer the Nation 31 March 2006). This was the lamenting of Mr Khurshid about the miserable plight” of our soldiers on the Kargil peaks for full two months which was not correct. It was the failure of the Indians not to remove Pakistani troops which India had boastfully claimed that it would evict the intruders in 72 hours. All the desperate efforts alongwith Bofor gun ammunition and hundreds of sorties could not make India dislodge our bold soldiers.
I also have some correspondence published in the News of Ist August 2006 with the spokesman of PPP, Farhatullah Babar about the doubts of showing pictures of some roads at Kel by Musharraf to the Prime Minister and about some official briefings duly recorded.
The latest letter of mine “Kargil – Another View” published in the Nation on 21 December 2011 contains about some civilian intelligentsia and many Generals unhappy speak about the Army misadventure. The Kargil Heights were initially under AK. These were handed over to IHK in 1972 Simla Agreement. India never had an intention to resolve Kashmir issue bilaterally. Hence, Pakistan had to react at some stage to make the Issue become a flashpoint. About 500 men of sorts, though not from the regular Pak units took over the unmanned Kargil Hills. Indian Generals were shaken and declared to drive away the intruders in 72 hours. They sent two jets which were shot down. India’s huge forces available in the area failed to dislodge the small group of determined hill-men. The month of June had come and gone with hundreds of the Indian coffins. It was here that “threat of war” was sent by India. Form Kargil onwards, Kashmir became the flashpoint.
The Kargil war claims a place in gambles of military history, not as a part of strategic plan but by way of “default”. At the end of Kargil episode, Indian Vice Admiral KK Nayyar lamented, “The Kargil crisis is directly attributable to the starvation of funds for the armed forces during the 90s”. The Indian Army accepted the defeat in the Kargil operations. Another military gamble is the Inchon Landing by Gen MacArthur in the Korean war of 1950-51 in a surprise operation in the ocean to take Seoul. The second gamble was played by President Sadat of Egypt when he attacked and occupied Barlev line in October 1973 and regained Sinai Peninsula. When the Army Chief asked “what next?” He replied. “we have no plan to attack, we want our Sinai back”. Soon, it was given back to Egypt. History is evident of fallouts of these military gambles. For once and all Kargil gamble will be proved with the peaceful liberation of Kashmir under the watch of United Nations. Never the less Kargil’s operation will serve as a black hole to Indian Army forever.
Brig ® AQ Anjum
2 Anjum Lane, Nadir Street
Adiala Road, Rwp